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ABSTRACT 
Constitutional law, technological innovations, and the rise of a cultural “Right to Know” have recently combined 
to yield “fake news,” as illustrated by an anti-abortion citizen-journalist sting operation that scammed Planned 
Parenthood.  We find that the First Amendment, as construed by the Supreme Court, offers scant protection for 
activist journalists to go undercover to uncover wrongdoing, while providing substantial protection for the spread 
of falsehoods.  By providing activists the means to reach sympathetic slices of the public, the emergence of social 
media has returned journalism to its roots in political activism, at the expense of purportedly objective and truthful 
investigative reporting.  But the rise of “truthiness”—that is, falsehoods with the ring of truth, diffused through 
new forms of communication—threatens the integrity of the media.  How to respond to these contradictions is a 
growing problem for advocates of free speech and liberal values more generally. 
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PROLOGUE 
 “You look at what’s happening last night in Sweden.  Sweden!  Who 
would believe this,” exclaimed Donald Trump at a political rally in Florida, 
not long after his election.  What had “happened” was that a little-known 
filmmaker, Ami Horowitz, was interviewed on Fox News about a film he had 
recently made purporting to show a “surge in gun violence and rape” at the 
hands of some immigrants admitted to a country that sees itself as a “human-
itarian superpower.”1  As is often the case when the current president repeats 
what he sees on his favorite TV station, the story was invented virtually out 
of whole cloth by a filmmaker trying to make a name for himself by playing 
up purported crimes at the hands of Muslim immigrants.  Not only that: it 
was denounced by the Swedish government, but not before a Russian news 
crew showed up in Rinkeby, a suburb of Stockholm where many immigrants 
live, and tried to bribe a few local residents to stage a riot.  The Russians, in 
turn, were discovered by a Danish news team who filmed their efforts to fake 
a riot.  Unlike many “fake” news episodes, this one was exposed by an alert 
“real news” source and a government that was quick to see its dangers. 
 This story, which we have summarized from the much richer and deeper 
analysis of W. Lance Bennett and Steven Livingston,2 is atypical only for its 
international resonance and for its quick exposure by an alert government 
and a lucky Danish news crew.  But it reveals in archetypical form what we 
see as a growing trend in mass communications: partisan news sources pick 
up and amplify manufactured or manipulated news stories that then gain 
 
1  See Rich Noack, Sweden Has No Idea What Trump Meant When He Said, ‘You Look at What’s Happen-
ing . . . in Sweden,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/-
worldviews/wp/2017/02/19/sweden-has-no-idea-what-trump-meant-when-he-said-you-look-at-
whats-happening-in-sweden/?utm_term=.cb88d098a613.  The Fox News segment at issue was 
Tucker Carlson Tonight: Filmmaker Documents Refugee Violence in Sweden (Fox News television broadcast 
Feb. 17, 2017).  For access to the segment online, see What the US Could Learn from Sweden’s Refugee 
Crisis, FOX NEWS (Feb. 17, 2017), http://video.foxnews.com/v/5327830979001/?#sp=show-
clips. 
2  W. Lance Bennett & Steven Livingston, The Disinformation Order: Disruptive Communication and the De-
cline of Democratic Institutions, EUR. J. COMM. (forthcoming 2018). 
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resonance in the broader public. 
The false story of the immigrant-fueled Swedish crime wave was not an 
isolated example of “fake news.”  For example, in the weeks before the elec-
tion, search giant Google’s algorithms were gamed to direct the far-right sup-
porters of Donald Trump (and others) to anti-Semitic websites.3  Meanwhile, 
BuzzFeed discovered hundreds of pro-Trump fake news sites, many of which 
had actually come from for-profit click farms in Macedonia.4  These sites, 
BuzzFeed speculated in an analysis of stories on Facebook, played “a significant 
role in propagating the kind of false and misleading content” that energized 
Trump’s partisans.5  Given the closeness of the election, some observers al-
leged that these stories might have been decisive in securing Trump’s victory, 
although the data do not conclusively show such an impact.6  Whatever their 
impact in 2016, their influence persists.  In the post-election period, a semi-
deranged citizen brandishing a shotgun invaded a pizzeria in Washington, 
D.C., claiming to have learned from a website that Hillary Clinton was using 
it as a conduit for running a sex slave operation.7  Shortly after Trump was 
sworn in as president, one of his top advisors defended false claims by the 
president and his press secretary about the size of the inauguration crowd, not 
by insisting on their veracity, but by calling them “alternative facts.”8  Since 
then, the President himself has repeatedly attempted to appropriate the term 
“fake news” to refer to accurate but negative coverage of his own actions.9 
 
 3 Carole Cadwalladr, Google, Democracy and the Truth About Internet Search, GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2016, 
5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/04/google-democracy-truth-in-
ternet-search-facebook (relaying how Google’s and Facebook’s search algorithms are “game[d]”). 
 4 Craig Silverman & Lawrence Alexander, How Teens in the Balkans Are Duping Trump Supporters with 
Fake News, BUZZFEED (Nov. 3, 2016, 7:02 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/how-
macedonia-became-a-global-hub-for-pro-trump-misinfo?utm_term=.uo8Bv61YQP#.-
puoKoLbpBq (explaining how teens in Macedonia have been creating websites with fake news 
content that is posted on Facebook in order to increase the traffic that their websites generate). 
 5 Id. 
 6 See Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 211, 232 (2017) (declining to draw firm conclusions but calculating based on survey data 
that the impact of fake news was “much smaller than Trump’s margin of victory in the pivotal states 
on which the outcome depended”). 
 7 Editorial Board, The Post’s View: ‘Pizzagate’ Shows How Fake News Hurts Real People, WASH. POST (Nov. 
25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/pizzagate-shows-how-fake-news-hurts-
real-people/2016/11/25/d9ee0590-b0f9-11e6-840f-e3ebab6bcdd3_story.html?utm_term=.-
34dda6684bd9. 
 8 Doina Chiacu & Jason Lange, White House Vows to Fight Media ‘Tooth and Nail’ over Trump Coverage, 
REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-priebus-
idUSKBN1560RM (quoting White House senior advisor Kellyanne Conway). 
 9 See, e.g., Angie Drobnic Holan, The Media’s Definition of Fake News v. Donald Trump’s, POLITIFACT 
(Oct. 18, 2017, 2:11 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2017/oct/18/decid-
ing-whats-fake-medias-definition-fake-news-vs/ (“Instead of fabricated content, Trump uses the 
term [‘fake news’] to describe news coverage that is unsympathetic to his administration and his 
performance, even when the news reports are accurate.”); id. (noting that as of mid-October 2017, 
Trump had decried what he calls fake news “at least 153 separate times in interviews, on Twitter 
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The private sector response to (actual) fake news is a work in progress.  
Facebook’s founder, Mark Zuckerberg, initially dismissed the idea that Fa-
cebook should take down hundreds of fake news sites.10  But as the issue of 
fake news heated up, the social media giant quietly joined Google in blocking 
many of these sites from its advertiser network.11  The issue became more 
complicated when a Syracuse cyber-activist, Daniel Sieradski, created what 
he called a “BS Detector” to alert readers to “unreliable news sources.”12  In 
reaction to Sieradski’s move, Facebook briefly blocked people from linking 
to his “Detector,” citing what it called “security reasons.”13 
The possible electoral influence of pro-Trump fake news and Trump’s 
own ambivalent relationship with the truth were largely responsible for the 
high volume of coverage of the “fake news” issue in the wake of the election.14  
But the volume and intensity of fake news, and of substantially-less-than-fully-
truthful news, have been increasing on the Internet for years, with both polit-
ical and legal implications.  A chain of events that was set in motion more 
than two years before the 2016 presidential election illustrates this trend. 
INTRODUCTION:  
THE PLANNED PARENTHOOD STING/SCAM 
In July 2014, a pair of anti-abortion activists, David Daleiden and Sandra 
Merritt, representing an organization called the Center for Medical Progress 
(“CMP”) and a bogus California-based company, BioMax Procurement Ser-
vices, met with an official of Planned Parenthood in a restaurant and tried to 
 
and in speeches”).  
 10 See Olivia Solon, Facebook Won’t Block Fake News Posts Because It Has No Incentive, Experts Say, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2015, 6:52 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technol-
ogy/2016/nov/15/facebook-fake-news-us-election-trump-clinton (noting Zuckerberg’s initial 
skepticism of Facebook’s role in spreading fake news that influenced the election and explaining 
that Facebook’s business model depends on users sharing content without professional filtering). 
 11 Id.; Samantha Schmidt, Facebook and Google Take Action Against Fake News Sites, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/11/15/facebook-and-
google-take-action-against-fake-news-sites/?utm_term=.120d6bd18c14. 
 12 Olivia Solon, Fake News Detector for Facebook Leads to Fake News Story About Who Made It, GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 2, 2016, 3:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/02/facebook-
fake-news-flag-techcrunch-bs-detector (explaining how Daniel Sieradski created a plug-in that was 
designed to spot fake news but TechCrunch, a technology website, misreported that Facebook itself 
had implemented the tool); Jane Wakefield, Fake News Detector Plug-In Developed, BBC (Dec. 2, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-38181158 (discussing TechCrunch’s erroneous report 
about Daniel Sieradski’s “Detector” and how fake news poses a threat to people in part because of 
the high volume of traffic it receives). 
 13 Solon, supra note 12; Wakefield, supra note 12. 
 14 See, e.g., Wakefield, supra note 12; Meg Kelly et al., President Trump’s List of False and Misleading Claims 
Tops 1,000, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2017/08/22/president-trumps-list-of-false-and-misleading-claims-tops-1000.  
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trick her into negotiating the sale of fetal body parts.15  This was the “sting” 
in the title of this Article.  The two activists secretly video-recorded the meet-
ing before editing it to make it seem that the official was offering to sell the 
body parts (rather than merely seeking to recoup costs, as permitted by law).16  
That was the attempted “scam” to which the title of this Article refers. 
Researchers studying the growth of mostly right-wing disinformation 
campaigns abroad and in the U.S. have noted the use of loosely coordinated 
online networks to create and disseminate false and misleading stories into 
the mainstream.17  The Planned Parenthood scam fit this pattern.  Daleiden 
and Merritt initially distributed the video via the Internet18 before it was 
picked up by the legacy media and by a string of conservative politicians—
including then-aspiring presidential candidate Bobby Jindal, then-Speaker of 
 
 15 Manny Fernandez, 2 Abortion Foes Behind Planned Parenthood Videos Are Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/26/us/2-abortion-foes-behind-planned-parenthood-
videos-are-indicted.html (discussing how a grand jury in Harris County, Texas, indicted two anti-
abortion activists who made undercover recordings of their discussion with a Planned Parenthood 
official); Alan Zarembo, U.S. Judge Halts Release of Secretly Recorded Videos of Abortion Providers, L.A. 
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2015, 7:37 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-0802-court-or-
der-20150802-story.html (explaining how a federal judge in San Francisco issued an order that 
restrains the release of a video showing Planned Parenthood officials discussing aborted fetuses and 
that prohibits anti-abortion individuals from releasing to the public the names or addresses of Na-
tional Abortion Federation employees).  Both the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times followed 
the story in a series of articles beginning in July 2015.  See Robin Abcarian, Undercover Video Sting of 
Planned Parenthood Is Off-Base, As Usual,  L.A. TIMES (July 16, 2015, 6:11 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/local/abcarian/la-me-ra-attacks-on-planned-parenthood-20150716-
column.html#page=1 (discussing the history of staged attacks against Planned Parenthood and the 
developments of the aforementioned conversation that took place with an unnamed person and 
Ms. Deborah Nucatola from Planned Parenthood’s medical services division); Jackie Calmes, With 
Planned Parenthood Videos, Activist Ignites Abortion Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 21, 2015), http://www.ny-
times.com/2015/07/22/us/with-planned-parenthood-videos-activist-ignites-abortion-issue.html 
(discussing Daleiden’s releasing of his private conversation with a Planned Parenthood employee 
and the political ramifications, both present and future, of his actions). 
 16 Jackie Calmes, Planned Parenthood Is Defended as Senate Democrats Block Bill to End Funding, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/us/politics/planned-parenthood-leader-
defends-group-as-senate-blocks-bill-to-end-Its-funding.html (reporting that Planned Parenthood 
officials explained that the videoed conversations, in which the organization purportedly negotiated 
the sale of fetal tissue for profit, really involved its seeking “reimbursement for the expense of provid-
ing fetal tissue”); Jennifer Gerson Uffalussy, Who Is the 26-Year-Old Man Behind the Planned Parenthood 
“Sting” Videos?, YAHOO BEAUTY (July 21, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/with-2nd-
planned-parenthood-sting-video-a-124676854202.html (reporting that the videos released by 
Daleiden were, according to Planned Parenthood, “meant to ‘mislead the public’ through their 
‘extremely heavy editing’”); Zarembo, supra note 15. 
17  See Bennett & Livingston, supra note 2.  There is no reason why fake news should be a predomi-
nantly right-wing phenomenon.  Appetite for and susceptibility to fake news appear to be driven 
partly by “whether one’s political party is or is not in power . . . suggesting that reception to fake 
news may be rising among liberals.”  Marcus Mann, The Differentiation of Cognitive Authority, 
Constraint of Beliefs, and the Spread of Fake News 17 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation proposal, 
Duke University) (on file with authors) (citations omitted). 
 18 See Jackie Calmes, Video Accuses Planned Parenthood of Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/us/video-accuses-planned-parenthood-of-crime.html. 
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the House of Representatives John Boehner, and Texas Governor Greg Ab-
bott.19  In response to the release of a similar CMP video targeting Planned 
Parenthood in Texas, the Houston district attorney convened a grand jury 
to investigate whether any laws had been broken.20 
Despite winning support from conservative website curators and politi-
cians already inclined to believe the worst about Planned Parenthood, 
CMP’s operation did not go entirely as planned.  CMP itself released both 
the highly edited and somewhat fuller versions of the video, although even 
the latter contained gaps and other evidence of having been edited.21   
Meanwhile, CMP encountered problems stemming from the recordings 
themselves, quite apart from the subsequent editing.  After the Houston 
grand jury convened, it indicted Daleiden and Merritt for using counterfeit 
government documents in order to trick the Houston Planned Parenthood 
official.22  According to the grand jurors, there was probable cause to believe 
that the two activists had falsified government documents and had attempted 
to purchase human body parts—both crimes under Texas law.23  A few 
weeks later, agents of California Attorney General Kamala Harris searched 
Daleiden’s apartment and seized video files and personal information.24  Ac-
cording to Daleiden, the agents had seized what he called his “First Amend-
ment work product.”25  A parallel federal civil lawsuit in San Francisco 
brought by the National Abortion Federation resulted in a temporary injunc-
tion against dissemination of the California video recordings.26  In March 
2017, Daleiden and Merritt were charged in the San Francisco Superior 
 
 19 Jackie Calmes & Nicholas St. Fleur, House Republicans to Investigate Planned Parenthood Over Fetal Tissue, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/us/house-republicans-to-in-
vestigate-planned-parenthood-over-fetal-tissue.html. 
 20 Danielle Paquette, The Charges Against Anti-Planned Parenthood Filmmaker, Explained, WASH. POST: 
POST NATION (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-na-
tion/wp/2016/01/26/the-charges-against-anti-planned-parenthood-filmmaker-explained/?-
utm_term=.d923d715c79b (“Initially, the grand jury set out to investigate Planned Parenthood.  
But on Monday, it instead returned charges against Daleiden.”). 
 21 Jackie Calmes, Planned Parenthood Videos Were Altered, Analysis Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/28/us/abortion-planned-parenthood-videos.html (reporting 
that an independent study commissioned by Planned Parenthood concluded that the so-called full 
version of the video was neither complete nor accurate.  FUSION GPS, CMP ANALYSIS 3 (Aug. 25, 
2015) (unpublished report), https://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/4214/4709/6038/Foren-
sic_report.pdf. 
 22 Fernandez, supra note 15. 
 23 Paquette, supra note 20. 
 24 Paige St. John, State Attorney General Seizes Videos Behind Planned Parenthood Sting, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 
2016, 5:57 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-attorney-general-seizes-planned-
parenthood-videos-20160405-story.html. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ctr. for Med. Progress, No. 15-CV-03522-WHO, 2015 WL 5071977, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2015), aff’d, 685 F. App’x 623 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. petition pending. 
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Court with one count of conspiracy and fourteen counts of electronically re-
cording private communications without consent.27   
When the Houston grand jurors indicted Daleiden and Merritt rather 
than the Planned Parenthood official they had stung, many people in the 
pro-choice community understandably cheered the stunning reversal.28  The 
indictment was not, however, an unmixed blessing for supporters of liberal 
causes.  Even as they condemned CMP for its deceptive editing of the 
Planned Parenthood videos, some observers noted that the indictment of 
Daleiden and Merritt could have a chilling effect on legitimate journalism.29  
Others were less concerned, however.  Legitimate journalists, they con-
tended, do not break the law.30  The immediate issue in Texas was mooted 
when, in July 2016, the charges against Daleiden and Merritt were dropped 
on procedural grounds at the behest of the prosecution.31 
Like other jurisdictions that have curtailed the historical independence of 
grand juries at common law,32 Texas limits the scope of a grand jury’s au-
thority to issue indictments for activities beyond those that the government 
seeks to investigate.33  Although Daleiden characterized the dismissal of the 
indictment as a vindication of “the First Amendment rights of all citizen jour-
nalists,” neither the prosecutor’s decision to seek dismissal of the charges nor 
the judge’s acquiescence in that decision appears to have been based on the 
First Amendment.34  The rights of self-proclaimed citizen journalists like 
 
 27 Complaint at 8, State v. Daleiden, SF2016300608 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2017).   
 28 See Danielle Paquette, Creator of Anti-Planned Parenthood Videos Faces Felony Charge, WASH. POST: POST 
NATION (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/01/25/-
creator-of-anti-planned-parenthood-videos-faces-felony-charge/?utm_term=.877c494c080c (“Ad-
vocates [of Planned Parenthood] applauded Monday’s grand jury decision.”). 
 29 Valerie Richardson, Even Planned Parenthood Supporters Troubled by Prosecution of Pro-Life Investigators, 
WASH. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/16/david-
daleiden-sandra-merritt-criminal-charges-dis (noting that several pro-choice professors of law and 
of journalism thought the criminal charges against Daleiden and Merritt would have a restrictive 
effect on journalism). 
 30 Id. (“Planned Parenthood officials argue that Mr. Daleiden and Ms. Merritt are criminals, not jour-
nalists [because] ‘[t]hey didn’t document wrongdoing—they fabricated it.’”). 
 31 Michael Graczyk, Duo Behind Fetal-Tissue Planned Parenthood Videos Cleared, USA TODAY (July 26, 
2016, 4:01 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/07/26/anti-abortion-duo-
fetal-tissue-videos/87578678/ (reporting that the Harris County prosecutor’s office requested the 
charges be dismissed after it concluded “that the grand jury had exceeded its authority by investi-
gating the activists after clearing Planned Parenthood of wrongdoing”). 
 32 Roger Roots, If It’s Not a Runaway, It’s Not a Real Grand Jury, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 821, 821–42 
(2000) (providing an overview of the common law authority of grand juries). 
 33 GEORGE E. DIX & JOHN M. SCHMOLESKY, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 23:7 (3d ed. 2016) (“[T]here is general agreement that [Texas] prosecutors have 
considerable discretion regarding charging matters and that their exercise of this discretion is to be 
afforded considerable deference [by grand juries].”). 
 34 See Graczyk, supra note 31 (reporting that the district judge “dismissed the tampering-with-govern-
ment-records charges . . . at the request of the Harris County prosecutor’s office,” which explained 
that “Texas law limits what can be investigated after a grand jury extension order is issued” and 
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Daleiden and Merritt remain very much an open question, one that may be 
answered in the federal or state court litigation in California. 
The ideological stakes of that question are mixed.  True, the Planned 
Parenthood sting/scam codes as anti-abortion and thus conservative.  Before 
founding CMP, Daleiden had worked with another anti-abortion group, 
Live Action, known for its video stings of abortion-rights groups.35  Yet liberal 
and progressive activists also use new forms of communication, combined 
with methods that either approach or cross the line of legality, to publicize 
targets whose practices they consider objectionable.  For example, a group 
calling itself “The Yes Men” made a series of films impersonating people or 
entities they disliked to expose them to public ridicule.36  And in the United 
States and elsewhere, organizations like Mercy for Animals and People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals (“PETA”) secretly video-record and pub-
licize the treatment of pigs, cows, and egg-laying hens on farms and in slaugh-
terhouses as a means of influencing public opinion and the law regarding 
animals raised for food.37 
Like anti-abortion activists, animal-rights activists have also sometimes 
found themselves on the wrong side of the law.  Consider a recent federal 
case: Idaho is one of seven U.S. states with what critics call “ag-gag” laws.38  
 
“the grand jury had exceeded its authority by investigating the activists”). 
 35 Samantha Allen, Maker of Planned Parenthood Video Called Abortion “Genocide”, DAILY BEAST (July 15, 
2015, 7:50 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/07/15/who-made-the-planned-
parenthood-video.html (detailing several “undercover video series” Live Action produced during 
and after Daleiden’s membership in the organization); Uffalussy, supra note 16 (stating that, while 
in college, Daleiden was “involved in the campus chapter of Live Action, a pro-life new-media 
movement that uses undercover investigations for its work to end abortion”). 
 36 Douglas Britt, The Yes Men Infiltrate DiverseWorks, CHRON. (Apr. 30, 2010, 5:30 AM), 
http://www.chron.com/entertainment/article/The-Yes-Men-infiltrate-DiverseWorks-1712890.-
php (explaining the process by which “the Yes Men” operate). 
 37 Mercy for Animals promotes its investigations, via its own website, MERCY FOR ANIMALS, 
http://www.mercyforanimals.org/investigations (last visited Aug. 13, 2017), and, as illustrated by 
its videos, through the mainstream media.  See mercyforanimals, Hidden Heroes: Meet Mercy for Animals 
Undercover Investigators, YOUTUBE (July 15, 2013), https://youtu.be/RYZveARts7M.  Other animal 
protection organizations conduct similar operations for similar purposes.  See, e.g., PETA, http://in-
vestigations.peta.org/ (last visited Aug. 13, 2017) (listing numerous exposés by PETA investigators 
of farming, meat industry, and animal-based research practices); see also Alan K. Chen & Justin 
Marceau, High Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1466–71 
(2015) (describing the effective use of undercover investigations by animal welfare organizations, 
their impact on public policy, and the state laws passed in response in order to shield the affected 
industries). 
 38 What Is Ag-Gag Legislation?, ASPCA, http://www.aspca.org/animal-cruelty/factory-farms/what-ag-
gag-legislation (last visited Dec. 12, 2016) (describing “ag-gag” laws as legislation that restricts pro-
tections for whistleblowers on industrial farms); see also Michael C. Dorf, Federal District Court Invali-
dates Idaho “Ag-Gag” Law, VERDICT (Aug. 12, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/08/12/fed-
eral-district-court-invalidates-idaho-ag-gag-law (discussing the importance and implications of the 
invalidation of Idaho’s “ag-gag” law). 
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The Idaho law criminalizes entering an “agricultural production facility” un-
der false pretenses and separately criminalizes creating an audio or video re-
cording of what takes place there without authorization from the government 
or the owners of the facility.39  Animal protection organizations successfully 
sued to enjoin enforcement of the law.40  A federal district judge concluded 
that the law was unconstitutional because it was hostile to the message the 
activists intended to convey by recording and publicizing activities at farms 
and slaughterhouses.41 
Yet, as we explain below, activists seeking to expose animal abuse, envi-
ronmental damage, exploitation of workers, and the supposed horrors of 
abortion are vulnerable under general principles of law.  As construed by the 
courts, the First Amendment forbids the government from singling out par-
ticular messages for special disadvantage but affords no special protection to 
journalists, much less to activists.42  As we discuss below, the case law gener-
ally permits the application of laws governing property, contract, and other 
matters to be used to keep journalists and activists away from their targets.43  
For example, if Daleiden and Merritt had been charged with violating a law 
forbidding lying to gain access to abortion facilities, they could well have had a 
successful First Amendment defense.  But because they were charged under 
broader general-purpose laws, they probably would not have had such a de-
fense to a charge like the one that they faced, had it issued from a grand jury 
with proper jurisdiction. 
Meanwhile, as we explore below, free speech law generally does protect 
the dissemination of opinions and purported statements of fact, even when 
those statements prove false.44  Most dramatically, in United States v. Alvarez,45 
the Supreme Court rejected the notion that lies necessarily fall outside the 
protection of the First Amendment. 
 
 39 IDAHO CODE § 18-7042(a), (d) (2017), invalidated by Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 
3d 1195 (D. Idaho 2015). 
 40 Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 1199, 1209, 1211–12.  
 41 Id. at 1205–07, 1209, 1211–12 (holding the statute violates the rights to free speech and equal pro-
tection because it targets animal activists and their message). 
 42 See infra Part I.A–B.  See generally Rodney A. Smolla, The First Amendment, Journalists, and Sources: A 
Curious Study in “Reverse Federalism,” 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1423 (2008) (arguing that federal law, 
which “[a] number of lower courts” have interpreted as providing no privilege for journalists, 
should follow the example of state laws in creating protections for journalists). 
 43 See infra Part I.A–B; see also, e.g., Anthony L. Fargo, The Year of Leaking Dangerously: Shadowy Sources, 
Jailed Journalists, and the Uncertain Future of the Federal Journalist’s Privilege, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 1063, 1076–77, 1079–80 (2006) (discussing recent changes in First Amendment protections for 
journalists, including their liability under common-law doctrines for trespass and disclosure of 
sources’ identity, and courts’ reluctance to recognize a journalist’s privilege). 
 44  See infra Part II. 
 45 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
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Taken as a whole, First Amendment doctrine produces a startling juxta-
position.  Stings—defined here to mean efforts to uncover hidden infor-
mation that the public has an interest in knowing—are legally vulnerable, 
while scams—the propagation of opinions and purported statements of fact 
that rest on false information—are generally protected.46 
The various legal doctrines that lead to favoring scams over stings may 
well be justified, all things considered.  But that does not make the result any 
less strange or less important: it could have serious implications for the chang-
ing relationship between journalism and activism. 
The balance of this Article shows how the law and the changing techno-
logical and social landscape together foster a “new” kind of activist journal-
ism.  We use quotation marks to indicate that the merger of journalism and 
activism typified by the Planned Parenthood sting/scam might be better 
characterized as a return to the roots of journalism in activism.  As we explain 
in Part III, the notion of journalism as the objective presentation of “just the 
facts” was largely a twentieth-century phenomenon.  In prior periods, jour-
nalism was a branch of activism.  We think journalism may well be returning 
to its activist roots. 
Yet in saying that the merger of journalism and activism has deep histor-
ical roots, we do not mean to deny the distinctiveness of the twenty-first-cen-
tury forms that activist journalism takes.  As the pre-election wave of fake 
news showed, in an era when someone as far away as Macedonia can shoot, 
edit, and widely share video on the Internet, and when traditional media 
companies tumble while blogs rise, the difference between activists on the 
one hand and the media on the other is less and less clear. 
Three elements—the peculiarities of contemporary American case law 
governing freedom of speech, the ideologically fragmented media landscape, 
and the public’s Right to Know47—collectively encourage the dissemination 
of what comedian Stephen Colbert aptly called “truthiness,”48 the quality of 
seeming to be true, without actually being true.  Citizen journalism holds 
great promise for democracy, but it also tends to produce fake news with the 
ring of truth rather than simply promoting a better-informed citizenry.  If we 
are right, then recent developments at the intersection between the law and 
citizen journalism have profound implications for American democracy. 
 
 46 See infra Part II. 
 47 MICHAEL SCHUDSON, THE RISE OF THE RIGHT TO KNOW: POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF 
TRANSPARENCY, 1945–1975, at 3–16 (2015) (describing the public’s “Right to Know,” which val-
ues openness and transparency to the public writ large, as a phenomenon that developed dramati-
cally during the 1950s through 1970s). 
 48 Colbert Report: The Word—Truthiness, COMEDY CENTRAL (Oct. 17, 2005), 
http://www.cc.com/video-clips/63ite2/the-colbert-report-the-word---truthiness (satirizing the 
idea of “absolute truth,” especially in the political arena). 
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I.  PROTECTION FOR JOURNALISM, NOT JOURNALISTS 
Readers who are not experts in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
case law could be expected to wonder whether the merger of activism and 
journalism will extend protection for activists or constrict protection for jour-
nalists.  Given the difficulty of distinguishing between activism and journal-
ism, what counts as journalistic activity?  With the decline of old media and 
the emergence of citizen journalism, does everyone now have the sort of con-
stitutional protection that once shielded only The New York Times and CBS 
News?  The short answer is “yes,”49 but the longer answer is more troubling.  
Even in the heyday of the institutional press, the Supreme Court construed 
the First Amendment as providing no special shield for the press as such.  
Yes, every blogger may be a journalist, but the status of journalist is, so far as 
the Supreme Court is concerned, nearly worthless. 
That is not to say that existing law provides no tools to shelter citizen jour-
nalists.  The Pentagon Papers case50 and subsequent decisions offer some protec-
tion to expressive activities like journalism.51  Moreover, state law may be fer-
tile ground for reconsidering the nature of journalism, because most states 
have long recognized at least a qualified privilege entitling reporters to shield 
their sources.52  As states begin to grapple with how those and other laws 
granting journalists distinctive privileges apply to citizen journalists, they can 
provide object lessons in how to adapt the law to the new media environment. 
A.  Federal Constitutional Law 
For most of American history, the First Amendment lay dormant.  In-
deed, it is not much of an exaggeration to say that the First Amendment was 
created in the twentieth century.  Despite protestations from Jeffersonians, it 
did not prevent the enactment and enforcement of the Sedition Act.53  Even 
landmark civil liberties decisions of the nineteenth century tended to ignore 
principles of free speech and free press.54  Thus, the Supreme Court disal-
lowed the use of military tribunals to try civilians,55 but did not block Presi-
dent Lincoln’s suppression of dissident speech.56  Prior to the modern era, 
 
 49 See Fargo, supra note 43, at 1112–19. 
 50 New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (hold-
ing that the Government did not meet its burden of proof in showing that the law restraining ex-
pression was constitutional). 
 51 See, e.g., id. 
 52 Smolla, supra note 42, at 1423, 1429–30. 
 53 HAROLD HOLZER, LINCOLN AND THE POWER OF THE PRESS: THE WAR FOR PUBLIC OPINION 
335–75 (2014). 
 54 Id. 
 55 See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
 56 HOLZER, supra note 53, at 335–75. 
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the First Amendment was thought to do little more than forbid prior re-
straints,57 implementing an important but narrow principle most famously 
championed by John Milton in Areopagitica in 1644.58 
This narrow view of free speech began to change after World War I and 
the ensuing first Red Scare.59  Even then, however, modern free speech prin-
ciples were articulated only in dissents by Justices Louis Brandeis and, after 
a time, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.60  Their views would not triumph until 
the Court began to stand up to McCarthyism in the late 1950s.61  Despite 
numerous censorial federal enactments, the Supreme Court did not invali-
date any act of Congress on First Amendment grounds until 1965.62 
Modern constitutional case law involving free speech and free press was 
shaped around two main images.  First, civil liberties were intertwined with 
civil rights.63  Second, the case law protected unlikely anti-heroes like racists64 
and peddlers of smut.65  The institutional press appeared as protagonists in 
some important cases, such as New York Times v. Sullivan,66 which limited lia-
bility for defamation of public officials absent reckless disregard for the 
truth,67 and the aforementioned Pentagon Papers case,68 which featured both 
the Times and the Washington Post as parties.  But the status of the press qua 
 
 57 LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: LEGACY 
OF SUPPRESSION 2–4 (Torchbook ed., Harper & Row 1963) (noting that those who believe the 
Framers intended a broad First Amendment protection of the press are relating back current views 
onto that era); see also id. at 8–9 (describing Blackstone’s definition of a free press under English 
common law as “the absence of censorship in advance of publication”); id. at 248 (stating that the 
Framers likely understood the First Amendment to protect a free press as defined by Blackstone). 
 58 JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (John W. Hales ed., Oxford at the Clarendon Press 1894) (1644). 
 59 THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS 
MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 57–60 (2015) (describing 
early academic opposition to the constraints on free speech enacted during World War I targeting 
“pacifists and Socialists”). 
 60 See generally id. (discussing how Justices Brandeis and Holmes came to redefine and reemphasize the 
First Amendment in their opinions). 
 61  See Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Age of McCarthy: A Cautionary Tale, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 
1406 (crediting Justice Brennan with the shift in the Court’s jurisprudence). 
 62 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (invalidating regulation of mail containing 
communist propaganda). 
 63 See generally HARRY KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965) (demonstrating 
how the African-American Civil Rights Movement changed the First Amendment). 
 64 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969).  Brandenburg states the canonical limits on gov-
ernment power to censor speech to protect public safety.  Id.  The winning party was a Klansman.  
Id. at 444. 
 65 See Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that a public figure could not recover 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from a lewd parody published in a porno-
graphic magazine).  Hustler is one of a great many free speech cases protecting pornographic publi-
cations. 
 66 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 67  Id. at 279–80. 
 68 New York Times, Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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press has played no formal role in these or other cases.  The logic of these 
cases would have given a person distributing leaflets in the public square the 
same rights as the Times and the Post. 
More broadly, Supreme Court case law largely rejects the notion that the 
right to freedom of the press grants the institutional press or people who work 
for it any protection beyond what is afforded to every individual as a matter 
of free speech.  Admittedly, normative arguments can be and have been 
made for giving the First Amendment’s press clause independent weight be-
yond the speech clause,69 and there may be some remaining room in the 
doctrine for treating journalists per se as special.70  Yet taken as a whole, the 
case law tends to treat journalists no better than anyone else. 
For example, in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,71 the Court held that police seek-
ing the identities of student protesters who had earlier clashed with authori-
ties could execute a search warrant against a newspaper, without making any 
special showing beyond what would be required to search a bakery or a bowl-
ing alley.72  Despite acknowledging that the First and Fourth Amendments 
emerged from a common history of executive abuse, the majority rejected 
the notion that special procedures should be adopted to protect newspapers 
or other media outlets.73 
The Zurcher ruling cited as precedent a 1972 case, Branzburg v. Hayes,74 which 
held that the First Amendment provides reporters with no privilege to shield 
confidential sources against a subpoena.75  There, the Court invoked the hoary 
principle that “the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence,” thus treating 
a professional journalist as no different from a random witness to a crime.76 
To be sure, modern free speech law does provide some protection for 
journalism, just not for journalists.  In other words, the status of working for 
a news organization confers no special First Amendment rights, but the law 
nonetheless may not single out for disadvantageous treatment those activities 
associated with speech and the press. 
The Pentagon Papers case is the most famous example of the Supreme 
Court holding that, absent a compelling particularized showing of imminent 
danger, the government may not block the dissemination of information, 
 
 69 See generally, e.g., Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2434 (2014). 
 70 See C. Edwin Baker, The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 955, 959–60 (2007). 
 71 436 U.S. 547 (1978). 
 72 Id. at 565–66. 
 73 Id. at 564–67. 
 74  408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 75 Id. at 708; see also Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 566. 
 76 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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even if the information came into the possession of the would-be dissemina-
tors as a consequence of law breaking.77  Pentagon Papers itself only vindicated 
the narrow principle championed by Milton in the seventeenth century: the 
First Amendment establishes a “heavy presumption against” prior re-
straints.78  But a subsequent ruling extended the protection to persons 
charged with after-the-fact liability.79 
How much protection do the principles established in these cases provide 
for journalism, and thus, indirectly, for journalists?  Some, but case law pro-
vides nothing like a get-out-of-jail-free card for contemporary citizen jour-
nalists (or even conventional journalists) who take their cellphone-video cam-
eras to slaughterhouses, to abortion clinics, or to the streets. 
The Idaho ag-gag case we described above illustrates both the speech-
protective and speech-unprotective features of contemporary case law.80  On 
the civil libertarian side of the ledger, it is notable that nothing in the federal 
district court opinion striking down Idaho’s law turned on the nature of the 
organizations suing.  They were activists who engaged in journalistic activi-
ties, which was sufficient to protect them.  Indeed, the district court opinion 
expressly compares the activists to early twentieth-century muckraking activ-
ist journalist Upton Sinclair.81  The Idaho ag-gag case thus shows that First 
Amendment doctrine now shelters activist journalism. 
Yet even assuming that the Idaho ag-gag ruling is upheld on appeal, jour-
nalism—by activists as well as by conventional journalists—remains highly 
vulnerable.  The fact that the Idaho law effectively singled out a particular 
message for special burdens was crucial to the district court’s ruling.82  Noth-
ing in the decision casts doubt on the ability of government officials and pri-
vate property owners to enforce general laws that do not target speech or par-
ticular messages.  Activists for animal rights and other causes, as well as 
conventional journalists, remain vulnerable to the application of general laws 
restricting trespass, enforcing contracts, forbidding fraud, and more. 
Consider the case that might have been brought against Daleiden and 
Merritt by a prosecutor working with a grand jury properly tasked with in-
vestigating them.  In Houston, Daleiden and Merritt initially stood accused 
of violating laws that apply to everyone.  For example, the charge of tamper-
 
 77 New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). 
 78 Id. (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U. S. 58, 70 (1963)). 
 79 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 514 (2001) (holding that the First Amendment shields radio 
commentators from civil liability for playing a recording on air, notwithstanding the fact that it was 
illegally recorded by a third party). 
 80 See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195 (D. Idaho 2015). 
 81 Id. at 1201–02. 
 82 Id. at 1204–07. 
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ing with a government document would not raise any First Amendment is-
sues at all if brought against a twenty-year-old who altered his driver’s license 
in an effort to purchase alcohol in violation of state law.  The Supreme Court 
cases denying special protection to journalists to resist searches or to shield 
their sources indicate that even bona fide journalists would be entitled to no 
First Amendment defense if they broke a general law to gain access to 
Planned Parenthood officials or other alleged evildoers83: the leading federal 
appeals court case, involving two reporters for ABC News, denied any special 
right of undercover access for investigators.84 
Daleiden and Merritt escaped prosecution under a technical limitation of 
the scope of grand jury jurisdiction in Texas.85  The dismissal of charges against 
them did not vindicate their First Amendment rights.  Indeed, as we have seen, 
if the case had gone forward, Supreme Court First Amendment case law would 
have left them vulnerable to prosecution and conviction.  Thus, they face the 
real prospect of conviction and imprisonment in California. 
B.  State Law 
In the United States, civil liberties are sheltered by not only the federal 
Bill of Rights but also by federal statutes, state constitutions, state statutes, 
and common law.  Despite repeated efforts in Congress to introduce legisla-
tion providing reporters with the right to shield sources,86 federal statutes 
provide no special protection to journalists or other investigators.  While a 
few federal appeals courts have suggested that there is some First Amend-
ment protection for a reporter-source shield, in light of Branzburg, “these 
courts may be skating on thin ice,” as Judge Richard Posner observed.87  
Does state law provide any additional rights?   
In key respects, the answer is no.  So far as we have been able to determine, 
no state permits an undercover activist or journalist to escape criminal or civil 
liability under an applicable general law (that is, one not directed specifically 
at speech or a particular message).88  In that respect, state constitutions have 
 
 83  See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
 84 See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 520–22 (4th Cir. 1999) (affirming 
damages award against journalists, who had forged documents to gain entry to supermarkets and 
secretly videotape the supermarkets’ practices, based on Supreme Court precedent upholding jour-
nalist liability under generally applicable laws). 
 85 See Graczyk, supra note 31. 
 86 See, e.g., Alicia Armbruster, Protecting Reporters’ Privilege?, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Apr. 12, 2007), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/protecting-reporters-privilege; Jason Stverak, The Senate’s 
Feel-Good Shield Law, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 9, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/arti-
cles/2014/04/09/the-senates-media-shield-law-is-toothless-and-arbitrary. 
 87 McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.2d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 88 There may be some wiggle room for journalists and activists in state tort law.  For example, Judge 
Posner expressed the background rule that “there is no journalists’ privilege to trespass,” even as he 
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generally been construed in parallel with the federal First Amendment. 
However, in one area, state law departs substantially from the federal 
model.  Nearly all of the states provide some protection to journalists to shield 
their sources.89  As of late 2015, thirty-nine states did so through statutory 
shield laws, with courts in a few states that lack such statutes filling the gap 
as a matter of common law or by construing state constitutional protections 
for free speech and free press more generously than the U.S. Supreme Court 
has construed the parallel provisions of the First Amendment.90  In providing 
journalists with a form of protection that the general public lacks, state law-
makers and—in the states that provide protection via common law or state 
constitutional interpretation—state courts have had to determine both what 
counts as journalism and who counts as a journalist. 
Most states distinguish between journalists—who qualify for the privi-
lege—and the rest of the public, presumably including activists, bloggers, 
YouTubers, and other self-appointed or part-time journalists.91  California’s 
shield law is quite typical.  It offers protection against contempt of court for 
journalists who shield their sources.92  The coverage extends to any “pub-
lisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a 
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a press associa-
tion or wire service.”93  A state intermediate appellate court held that this 
language extends to publication online, at least where the Internet-based 
publication was in most respects similar to older media.94 
 
found that consent to enter property is often valid even though obtained by fraud, and thus ruled 
in favor of journalists who posed as patients to expose profit-motivated bad medical decisions by 
doctors.  Desnick v. ABC, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351–55 (7th Cir. 1995).  But even read for all that 
it is worth, this protection apparently could be overridden by a state legislature without offending 
state or federal constitutional law.  And even without such an override, other courts disagree.  See, 
e.g.,  Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. ABC, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1201–02 (D. Ariz. 1998) 
(holding that consent induced by misrepresentation or a mistake known to an alleged trespasser is 
“not effective”), aff’d, 306 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2002); Shiffman v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 
681 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding that “consent obtained by misrepresentation 
or fraud is invalid”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) 
(cited by the courts in both of the preceding citations). 
 89 Smolla, supra note 42, at 1429 (stating “that some 49 states and the District of Columbia have ex-
tended some form of newsgathering privilege to citizens”). 
 90 Paul M. Smith & Jessica Ring Amunson, State Shield Laws, in 2 TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 8:6 (3d 
ed. 2015). 
 91 Cf. Paul M. Smith & Jessica Ring Amunson, Who May Assert the Privilege, in 2 TESTIMONIAL 
PRIVILEGES § 8:8 (3d ed. 2015) (noting that only a few states protect the latter category of online 
activists, bloggers, YouTubers, etc.). 
 92 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070(a) (West 2009). 
 93 Id.  Nearly all other states have similar restrictions.  A complete list of state shield laws can be found 
in Smith & Amunson, supra note 90, at n.1. 
 94 See O’Grady v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 72, 99–105 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that 
the California shield law protected a news website “which differ[ed] from traditional periodicals” 
only slightly). 
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A few state laws could be construed to provide even broader coverage.  
For example, Georgia affords a qualified right to shield confidential sources 
to “[a]ny person . . . engaged in the gathering and dissemination of news for 
the public through . . . electronic means.”95  In principle, that would entitle 
an activist blogger to protection.  Likewise, the Maryland statute specifically 
includes protection for persons working (even as independent contractors or 
students) for entities that use “electronic means of disseminating news and 
information to the public.”96  A 2006 intermediate appellate decision con-
strued this language as covering an online financial newsletter,97 and it too 
could in principle be said to cover activist bloggers.  The West Virginia shield 
law only covers reporters but defines “reporter” in a way that could reach 
activists.98  A New Jersey trial court judge found that that state’s shield law, 
which extends to persons “connected with . . . news media”99 did not cover 
all bloggers, but did cover a blogger/activist for a website affiliated with a 
nonprofit county government watchdog organization.100 
Four other state shield laws likewise contain language that could be un-
derstood to reach activists,101 although the count is necessarily tentative be-
cause there is very little case law testing the bounds of who is or is not a 
journalist entitled to shield her sources.  Laws that on their face appear to 
apply to activists could be construed narrowly, while laws that are written in 
narrower terms could be construed more broadly. 
However, even if construed broadly to cover activists, state shield laws do 
not in practice provide much more protection than does federal law.  Under 
state law, the privilege is typically qualified, not absolute; it can be overcome 
by a special showing of need for the evidence.102  Moreover, even a strong 
privilege will not protect a journalist’s source in all proceedings.  A reporter 
cannot count on a state law shielding her sources because she cannot know 
in advance if she will be called to testify in federal court in relation to issues 
of federal law, where the no-shield rule of Branzburg applies.103  Accordingly, 
a reporter who aims to assure a source that she will truly protect the source 
 
 95 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-508 (2017). 
 96 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (West 2017). 
 97 Forensic Advisors, Inc. v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 907 A.2d 855, 863 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006). 
 98 W. VA. CODE. ANN. § 57-3-10 (West 2017) (“‘Reporter’ means a person who regularly gathers, 
prepares, collects, photographs, records, writes, edits, reports, or publishes news or information that 
concerns matters of public interest for dissemination to the public for a substantial portion of the 
person’s livelihood, or a supervisor, or employer of that person in that capacity.”). 
 99  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21–21.8 (West 2017). 
 100 In re Jan. 11, 2013 Subpoena by Grand Jury, 75 A.3d 1260, 1263, 1267–68 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 2013). 
 101 MINN. STAT. § 595.023 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144–147 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520 
(2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (2017). 
 102 See Fargo, supra note 43, at 1068, 1119; see also Smolla, supra note 42, at 1429. 
 103 See FED. R. EVID. 501 (recognizing state law privileges only “regarding a claim or defense for which 
state law supplies the rule of decision”). 
18 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:1 
cannot rely on the law; instead, the reporter must make a credible promise 
to go to jail for contempt rather than submit to a court order to testify. 
Yet if state shield laws provide little in the way of practical assurance to 
journalists or activists, at least they show that state lawmakers and judges 
have explored an alternative to the federal approach under which the First 
Amendment provides no protection to speech and the press against the ap-
plication of general laws.  The existence of even a qualified privilege under 
state law thus establishes an important principle. 
How far that principle should go raises a set of difficult normative ques-
tions.  The Supreme Court case law declining to give special protection to 
speech, speakers, or the institutional press might be thought to go too far in 
limiting speech.  Indeed, it seems especially problematic that journalists and 
activists can be penalized for lying to gain access to private property in order 
to discover facts of legitimate interest to the public, while police may use in-
formants—aptly called “pretend friends” by one commentator104—to gain 
such access in order to investigate suspected criminal activity without abridg-
ing privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment.105 
Yet it is not clear that the different approaches should be harmonized by 
permitting journalist/activist access, rather than by denying police access 
(absent satisfaction of Fourth Amendment requirements).  After all, there are 
legitimate concerns that counsel caution before trying to fashion a constitu-
tional or other rule granting journalists or activists the access they would seek.  
These include security, privacy, and the difficulty of drawing sensible lines 
dividing the press, activists, and the general public. 
Whether activists should be able to claim statutory, common-law, or con-
stitutional protection for their reportage has implications for a great many 
questions.  Who, if anyone, may shield a whistleblower or other source?  
Should people have a right to record their interactions with the police?  To 
record the interactions of others with the police?  What of activists like Dalei-
den and Merritt who go undercover to investigate alleged or imagined 
wrongdoing, whether by doctors, farmers, bankers, or government agencies?  
Should the mere breaking of the law deprive them of protection as speakers?  
And if so, what about people and institutions that receive and then publish 
information obtained by lawbreakers? 
As we have seen, case law and statutes appear to provide straightforward 
answers to questions like these.  From Daniel Ellsberg to Edward Snowden, 
the fact that a source of information is tainted has not been thought to be 
sufficient grounds for the government to restrain publication.  At the same 
time, however, the First Amendment does not give professional journalists 
 
 104 Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a 
Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 139 (2002). 
 105 See id. at 139–44. 
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any preferred position.  Whether reporters seek to shield sources or to resist 
search warrants, the Constitution treats journalists no differently from bakers 
and candlestick makers.  And while state law provides some special privileges 
to reporters to shield their sources, it does not appear to provide journalists 
any broader exemptions. 
That result might, at first blush, seem sensible.  After all, if anyone with 
a mobile phone can plausibly claim to be a journalist, then journalists can 
claim no exemption from general legal obligations.  But seen from the oppo-
site direction, the law’s leveling down is profoundly disturbing.  If no one is 
a journalist because everyone is a potential journalist, then there is no free-
dom of the press.  As we also have seen, the Supreme Court’s cases do not 
go quite that far.  As the Pentagon Papers case illustrates, the Court provides 
some protection for the activity of journalism, even though the status of being 
a journalist provides no special rights.  Whether that protection is enough, 
given the ease with which First Amendment limits can be circumvented 
through the application of general laws to journalists and activists, depends 
on how one weighs such incommensurable factors as speech, privacy, secu-
rity, and the relative institutional advantages of courts and legislators. 
II.  LAW’S PERVERSE EFFECTS 
Different readers will draw different conclusions about whether U.S. law 
adequately protects journalists and/or activists who go undercover to expose 
real or imagined evils.  For our purposes, however, it will be useful to contrast 
the scant protection afforded to undercover investigations with the relatively 
robust protection the law affords to the dissemination of falsehoods.  As we 
shall see, the law plays a role in reinforcing the alternate realities that modern 
technology and social norms facilitate.  The law’s impact may be perverse, 
as the Planned Parenthood story reveals. 
We have distinguished between two phases of the anti-Planned 
Parenthood operation—the sting and the scam: 
• In the sting phase, Daleiden and Merritt misrepresented their identities in 
order to gain access to Planned Parenthood officials, whom they surrep-
titiously recorded. 
• In the scam phase, they used CMP and a network of social conservative 
blogs, media outlets, and politicians to spread the false message that 
Planned Parenthood profits from the sale of fetal body parts obtained via 
abortions.106 
A legal regime designed to vindicate a broad-based right of the public to 
learn the truth would seemingly provide robust (or at least some) protection 
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for undercover investigators seeking to detect wrongdoing that affects the 
public interest while discouraging the spread of false information.  It would, 
in other words, protect the sting while discouraging the scam.  And yet, our 
legal system does nearly precisely the opposite. 
As we have seen, neither freedom of speech nor freedom of the press would 
prevent the prosecution of actors such as Daleiden and Merritt for violating 
speech-neutral laws like those forbidding falsifying government documents.107  
More generally, undercover journalists and activists have no free speech shield 
under state or federal law for violating speech-neutral laws protecting property, 
privacy, or contracts.  Although clumsy legislative efforts (such as the Idaho ag-
gag law) that target speech or particular viewpoints will fail, sophisticated gov-
ernment and private lawyers seeking to restrict access to sensitive facilities or 
personnel will increasingly turn to general laws and common law doctrines to 
keep out journalists and activists.  In short, stings are vulnerable. 
By contrast, scams in the sense of false claims of the sort made by Dalei-
den and CMP, as well as completely fake news of the sort that drew attention 
following the 2016 presidential election, can thrive.  Indeed, to a considera-
ble extent, such scams are constitutionally protected.   
Consider the case of United States v. Alvarez.108  A local government official 
who falsely claimed to have received the Congressional Medal of Honor was 
indicted and convicted for violating the Stolen Valor Act, a federal statute 
that criminalizes false statements about military awards, with special penal-
ties for such statements about the Congressional Medal of Honor.109  Even 
while describing the official as a habitual liar, the Supreme Court invalidated 
the conviction and the Act on free speech grounds.110  In the lead opinion, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy rejected the Government’s “contention that false 
statements have no value and hence no First Amendment protection.”111 
To be sure, Alvarez involved a criminal prosecution.  It left civil liability 
available for defamatory statements, but this option came with an important 
caveat.  As the Court itself emphasized in Alvarez, “Even when considering 
some instances of defamation and fraud . . . falsity alone may not suffice to 
bring the speech outside the First Amendment.  The statement must be a 
knowing or reckless falsehood.”112 
Would that caveat avail Daleiden and CMP in a defamation suit target-
ing the scam?  The answer is not entirely clear.  The leading Supreme Court 
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case allows that deliberate misquotations in print can be the basis for a libel 
action consistent with the First Amendment.113  No similar case has decided 
whether that principle extends to editing out context (but not otherwise al-
tering content) of video so as to mislead viewers about what was meant. 
However, even assuming that Daleiden and CMP could be held liable for 
defamation based on misleading editing, such liability leaves targets like 
Planned Parenthood highly vulnerable to misleading as well as outright fake 
reports about its activities.  Proving deliberate or reckless misquotation will be 
difficult, as the defendant can always claim (often justifiably) that some edito-
rial judgment is necessary to turn notes or raw footage into sellable news.  
Moreover, civil damages will often be inadequate, even when they succeed. 
Suppose that the plaintiffs ultimately succeed in obtaining a judgment 
against CMP and Daleiden in the civil litigation in California.  CMP and 
Daleiden almost certainly lack the resources to satisfy a judgment for all of 
the damage that will have been done by the scam, including the loss of future 
public resources.  Thus, tort liability for CMP and Daleiden will not neces-
sarily protect Planned Parenthood from harm to its reputation. 
Consider the important example of the Association of Community Or-
ganizations for Reform Now (“ACORN”), which was the victim of a 2009 
sting/scam that foreshadowed the one directed at Planned Parenthood.114  
In response to the spread across the politically conservative mediaverse of the 
false meme that ACORN systematically promoted voting fraud, Congress 
defunded it.115  ACORN sued the government, claiming that the defunding 
measure was an unconstitutional “bill of attainder”—that is, a punishment 
impermissibly meted out by the legislature rather than by the courts.116 
But ACORN’s lawsuit failed.117  According to the federal appeals court 
that resolved the case, Congress merely failed to fund, but did not punish, 
ACORN.118  From the perspective of ACORN and its enemies, of course, 
that was a distinction without a difference.  Even before the appeals court 
delivered that coup de grâce, the writing was on the wall.  Starved of the public 
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resources on which it had come to rely,119 ACORN disbanded.120  The 
sting/scam had worked. 
In noting the inadequacy of liability for defamation as a means of deter-
ring future scams, we do not mean to suggest a clear path of law reform.  As 
a candidate for office, Donald Trump proposed to “open up” libel laws to 
make it easier for plaintiffs to win defamation judgments,121 but as president 
there is little he can do to accomplish this goal.  Tort law is state law, not 
federal law, and even if President Trump can use his bully pulpit to influence 
state defamation law, there is no reason to think that the Supreme Court 
would overrule the constitutional limits on defamation liability. 
Nor should it.  The justices were right to worry that the alternative of too-
easy liability for defamation can be used to harass and intimidate activists 
who are not scammers.  It is no accident that the leading case limiting such 
liability on First Amendment grounds involved a lawsuit by an Alabama of-
ficial against the New York Times for publishing an advertisement by civil 
rights activists.122  And even when legitimate speech is ultimately protected, 
defending a lawsuit can be costly—as Oprah Winfrey discovered when 
ranchers sued her under the Texas False Disparagement of Perishable Food 
Products Act for airing a television show segment about mad-cow disease.123 
Nor is it clear that free speech doctrine ought to be changed to grant 
journalists and activists a privilege to conduct stings.  In their illuminating 
discussion of undercover journalism (including by activists), Alan Chen and 
Justin Marceau persuasively argue that ag-gag laws and other laws that target 
what they helpfully call “investigative deceptions” violate the First Amend-
ment.  They contend that such deceptions should be protected because they 
promote the truth, by contrast with those lies that receive First Amendment 
protection despite the damage they do.124 
We agree entirely, but as we explained above, in general the free speech 
and free press rights protect only against laws and policies that target speech 
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based on its content, not against the application of general laws and doc-
trines—such as property, contract, and the like—that happen to infringe on 
expression in particular cases.125  Perhaps constitutional doctrine ought to be 
changed to provide greater protection against such incidental burdens (as 
one of us has argued);126 yet such a change could have real costs, especially 
in an era when social conservatives increasingly point to religious freedom 
and freedom of expression as grounds for opting out of legal obligations to 
avoid discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation or otherwise comply 
with general laws.127 
Thus, each piece of the legal regime may be justified in its own terms, but 
collectively, the regime creates perverse incentives.  Journalism receives no 
special protection against general laws for legitimate fear of what the Court 
called, in a different First Amendment context, making every citizen “a law 
unto himself.”128  By contrast, dissemination of information, even if false, is 
protected for fear of harassment of those expressing unpopular viewpoints.  
Taken together, these two principles make it relatively difficult for activist 
journalists to uncover the truth about the targets of their dissatisfaction and 
relatively easy for them to disseminate falsehoods about those targets. 
Although perhaps justified in their separate domains, the legal principles 
interact with each other and with the new media landscape to create a perfect 
storm.  With bona fide investigation posing substantial risks but promulga-
tion of falsehoods subject to at most modest penalties, it is hardly surprising 
that activist journalists and the organizations and media outlets that support 
them perpetrate and promulgate scams.  Journalism struggles, while fake 
news thrives.  Thus, the anti-Planned Parenthood scam may prove to be less 
ideological performance art than the harbinger of an age of “truthiness,” as 
we will argue below. 
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III.  ACTIVIST JOURNALISM, PAST AND PRESENT 
Have we entered a new age?  Authors who write about the twenty-first-
century rise and implications of citizen journalism often treat the phenome-
non as if it were radically new.  For example, commenting breathlessly on 
the impact of the digital revolution on journalism, New Yorker staff writer Jill 
Lepore wrote: “With our phones in our hands and our eyes on our phones, 
each of us is a reporter, each a photographer, unedited and ill judged, chat-
ting, snapping, tweeting, and posting, yikking and yakking.  At some point 
does each of us become a party of one?”129 
But the link between activism and the media that Lepore observes is far 
from new.  As sociologist Paul Starr writes, “as remarkable as the recent wave 
of innovation has been, it is only the latest phase of a centuries-long process 
that has been punctuated by a series of upheavals in communications and 
information at least as revolutionary as our own.”130  Although Daleiden and Mer-
ritt were using the newest tools of technology, they acted in line with a long 
tradition of subversive activist journalism, which began with the advent of 
cheap printing in the eighteenth century and rose to a crescendo with the 
industrialization of journalism and the rise of investigative journalism in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.131 
Like the current one, these upheavals came not only from technological 
breakthroughs but from their interactions with the political contexts in which 
they were born.  As Starr demonstrates in his book, the media were shaped by 
politics from the beginning.132  Although Starr shows how American policy 
made U.S. media a world leader,133 media everywhere have long been a tool 
for political activists.  This manifested in Europe early with the diffusion of what 
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Benedict Anderson called “print-capitalism.”134  If a man could read in his na-
tional press about how insurgents in another country overthrew their ruler, then 
ruler-overthrow became conceivable everywhere.135  As Anderson writes of the 
French Revolution, “[O]nce it had occurred, it entered the accumulating 
memory of print . . . . [T]he experience was shaped by millions of printed words 
into a ‘concept’ on the printed page, and, in due course, into a model.”136 
A.  American Journalism and Activism 
When we look back to the eighteenth century, the idea of journalists as 
objective reporters looks like a brief twentieth-century interlude in a much 
longer story of the inseparability of journalism, activism, and social move-
ments.  For example, in 1774 a failed English excise worker named Thomas 
Paine stepped off a boat in Philadelphia with a letter of introduction from 
Benjamin Franklin to Robert Aiken, a well-known printer in the town.137  
Paine’s ideas were not particularly new or even radical.138  What made his 
impact on history so great was not only his role in two revolutions—the Amer-
ican and the French—but his capacity to merge activism and journalism.139 
Paine arrived in a country that was practically covered in printed papers.  
Bernard Bailyn reports that there were thirty-eight newspapers in the Amer-
ican colonies in 1775.140  As the conflict with Britain heated up, broadsides 
appeared everywhere, and even almanacs “carried, in odd corners and oc-
casional columns, a considerable freight of political comment.”141 
It was in the form of political pamphlets that the democratic implications of 
print flourished.  “Highly flexible, easy to manufacture, and cheap, pamphlets 
were printed in the American colonies wherever there were printing presses, 
intellectual ambitions and political concerns.”142  By the time Paine arrived in 
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America, pamphlet wars were a familiar part of the political landscape.143 
“In the early days of the American republic,” writes Lance Bennett, “the 
news was anything but objective.”144  When the Democratic-Republicans of 
Thomas Jefferson campaigned to oust the Federalists of John Adams from 
the presidency, they employed the services of a Scottish republican activist 
named James Callender, who published a scurrilous diatribe against Adams 
in the Examiner and other pro-Jeffersonian essays in the National Magazine to 
help Jefferson win the 1800 election.145  For his trouble, Callender was pros-
ecuted for sedition by the outgoing Adams administration.146 
For much of the nineteenth century, newspapers “were either funded by 
or were otherwise sympathetic to particular political parties, interests, or ide-
ologies.  People bought a newspaper knowing what its political perspective 
was and knowing that political events would be filtered through that perspec-
tive.”147  Later publishers, like William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer, 
had looser ties with party machines, but their papers were full of “high-profile 
crusades and stunts” intended to attract readers and put forward their polit-
ical viewpoints.148  Pulitzer’s New York World “combined sensationalism and 
storytelling with a crusading liberal reformism and built circulation . . . with 
investigations of tenement housing, adulterated food, official misconduct (in-
cluding police brutality), and corporate malfeasance.”149  The muckraking 
journalism that had its apogee in the beginning of the twentieth century with 
Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle150 had its origins in the pages of Hearst’s and Pu-
litzer’s papers.151 
Journalism only began to separate from activism in the new century, as 
the population grew—and grew more diverse—and as the economics of the 
news business evolved.  The norm of objectivity, which was eventually natu-
ralized through journalism schools and the claims of the elite press (e.g., “All 
the News That’s Fit to Print”), developed out of the expansion of the market 
for news and from its standardization through the wire services.152  But not 
even standardization ended the politicization of the press, which grew out of 
 
 143 See id. at 4–5 (highlighting different ways pamphlets were used during the Revolutionary Period). 
 144 W. LANCE BENNETT, NEWS: THE POLITICS OF ILLUSION 158 (10th ed. 2016). 
 145 MICHAEL DUREY, “WITH THE HAMMER OF TRUTH”: JAMES THOMSON CALLENDER AND 
AMERICA’S EARLY NATIONAL HEROES 117 (1990) (providing an example of subjective news in 
early America). 
 146 Id. at 125–35. 
 147 BENNETT, supra note 144, at 158. 
 148 STARR, supra note 130, at 254. 
 149 Id. at 256. 
 150  UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Joslyn T. Pine ed., Dover Thrift Editions 2001) (1906). 
 151 Sinclair himself likely would not have acknowledged the debt, as his work was highly critical of the 
Hearst press. See generally UPTON SINCLAIR, THE BRASS CHECK (1919).   
 152 BENNETT, supra note 144, at 161. 
Oct. 2017] STINGS AND SCAMS 27 
the competition for markets.  Even the Associated Press, which was a major 
force for standardization, was intricately bound up with politics.153  The con-
nection between journalism and politics in America had profound implica-
tions for the future of social and political movements. 
B.  Journalism in Movement 
Although a movement press was most highly developed in Europe, with its 
mass parties and ideologies, the phenomenon was not limited to the old world.  
Indeed, in America, a genuine movement press grew out of the agrarian, an-
archist, socialist, and populist movements that arose during the last decades of 
the nineteenth century.154  The agrarian revolt that began in the late 1880s 
was archetypical: editors supporting the agrarian cause founded hundreds of 
papers throughout the South and West to denounce the railroads and robber 
barons and to support William Jennings Bryan’s presidential candidacies.155 
But until recent decades, activist journalism was constrained by the high 
costs of traditional newspaper printing and by its static capital establish-
ments.  It took the development of electronic communication to liberate ac-
tivists from these constraints.  As the audience for digital—and especially for 
social—media grew, activist journalism was freed from the ponderous organ-
izations and the norms of objectivity that had previously constrained the 
printed press.  This change has led to the rapid formation of online newspa-
pers, personal blogs, and audiovisual media to expose the real or invented 
defects of political opponents.156  It has also led to the use of stunts made 
explicitly for circulation through the media. 
Some of the new activist journalists, like the “Occupy” movement’s Tim 
Pool, operate from within movements.157  Others, like The Intercept’s Glenn 
Greenwald, come from a traditional journalism background but embrace the 
goals of a movement and occasionally skirt the borders of legality—as he did 
in publicizing the Snowden revelations in 2013.158  Still others embrace what 
can be called “the practice of the objective,” in which reaching the goal or 
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objective on your own is the message of the movement.159 
But few of these activist journalists possess the wherewithal to widely dif-
fuse the results of their activities on their own.  To do so, they need to de-
velop, or employ, the mechanisms and the professionalism of mass-based so-
cial media, which have the capacity to reach key sectors of the public that 
those who carry out the stings wish to reach.  And this takes us back to the 
legal dilemma that we explored above: that the law appears to punish journalistic 
“stings” but offers more protection to the dissemination of falsehoods, that is, to fake news. 
The Daleiden and Merritt operation against Planned Parenthood raises 
thorny questions of both legality and rights.  The First Amendment prohibits 
laws “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,”160 and thus, one might 
think, today’s radical democratization of journalism poses a conceptual chal-
lenge of identifying “the press.”  Yet, as we saw in Part I, American law largely 
punts on that issue.  Under the existing case law, everyone and no one is the 
press.  How does the Supreme Court’s indifference to the distinction between 
the press and the rest of us interact with the new media landscape? 
C.  The Public’s “Right to Know” and the Rise of “Truthiness” 
The first thing we need to understand about the new technologies is that 
they facilitate—but have not produced—the problems that we as citizens 
face in the re-integration of journalism and activism.  These problems arise 
because of the assumption that we have a Right to Know, rather than from 
technological innovation alone, and this Right to Know provides incentives 
and avenues for the diffusion of information, quasi-information, and outright 
lies, all through the same media. 
We do not mean to suggest that new technology per se has had no effects.  
On the contrary, in some domains—such as police-citizen interactions—the 
effects may turn out to be profound.  The ubiquity of video cameras in mo-
bile phones transforms what were once swearing contests into public events.  
However, the phenomenon that chiefly concerns us here is not the random 
citizen who accidentally becomes a journalist because she happens to observe 
police brutality.  Instead, we are focusing on activists who set out to capture 
evidence of (real or imagined) wrongdoing, and then disseminate the evi-
dence to the public.  No new technology of capture is needed for this task.  
Miniature recorders have existed for decades and are not, in any event, 
strictly necessary for undercover activist journalism.  After all, Upton Sinclair 
simply took notes.  What is truly new is a profound change in the cultural 
understanding that forms the backdrop for the new technologies of diffusion. 
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At the country’s founding, there would certainly have been no under-
standing that citizens had the right to know everything that their government 
or their fellow citizens did or thought.  It has been more than a century since 
Louis Brandeis opined that “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants,”161 
but it has been a mere half-century since the enactment of the federal Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA), which is emblematic of the modern cultural 
and legal expectation of the Right to Know.  “Things widely taken for 
granted since the 1970s,” writes Michael Schudson, “from doctors’ willing-
ness to inform dying patients they are dying to unit pricing in the supermar-
ket and nutritional information listed on a package label, are developments 
of the 1960s and after.”162 
Reversing the diffusion of information by activist journalists would in-
volve curtailing not only the use of technology but what has become a “cul-
tural right to know.”163  It is that “cultural right to know” that animates the 
citizen journalism of today and that galvanized activists like Daleiden and 
Merritt to insinuate themselves into Planned Parenthood and utilize a rela-
tively simple technology to “expose” the organization’s supposed sins. 
But “the public” in the “public’s right to know” is an abstraction.  Dalei-
den and Merritt were not speaking to “the public,” but to an already-con-
vinced slice of the public through “movement halfway-houses” that were will-
ing to broadcast and authenticate their message.164  In scamming Planned 
Parenthood, these new media outlets were projecting—through a lie—what 
they “knew to be true”: that Planned Parenthood is an inherently evil organ-
ization.  They made use of a network of online “news” sources, the Internet-
fortified rumor mill, and, eventually, the legacy press which gave them the 
publicity they craved, even if it was not always favorable.  Their scam trav-
eled the same byways as other fake news. 
As we have seen, the commingling of activism and journalism is nothing 
new in American history.  What is new is the network of radio talk shows, 
 
 161 Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER’S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, at 10. 
 162 SCHUDSON, supra note 47, at 14. 
 163 Id. at 7. 
 164 Sociologist Aldon Morris coined the term “movement halfway-house” to refer to “an established 
group or organization that is only partially integrated into the larger society because its participants 
are actively involved in efforts to bring about a desired change in society.”  ALDON D. MORRIS, 
THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 139 (1984).  Although “their relative isolation 
from the larger society” initially limits movement halfway houses’ ability to “disseminate their 
views” society-wide, these institutions enable activists to “develop a battery of social change re-
sources.”  Id. at 139–40.  In developing the concept of the halfway house in the context of the civil 
rights movement, Morris illustrates its role in forming a generation of civil rights militants and 
eventually diffusing the movement’s message to a broader public.  See id. at 139–73.  Needless to 
say, movement halfway houses may operate anywhere on the political spectrum. 
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blogs, printed publications, and foundations that sit between citizen journal-
ists like Daleiden and Merritt and the audiences for their productions.  That 
is the key innovation in early twenty-first century activist journalism, and not 
the technology itself or the willingness of activist journalists to play fast and 
loose with the truth.  It is these nodes of information transmission that au-
thoritatively diffuse information which—on its own—might have little resili-
ence and even less persistence. 
Remember how widely the “news” that Barack Obama was not a U.S.-
born citizen diffused?  That soundbite might have seemed preposterous when 
it issued from the mouths of Donald Trump and his ilk, a “meme” made for 
the moment.  Yet in 2016, majorities of some sectors of the public still be-
lieved it.165  They believed it not because it issued from the mouths of “in-
formants” a near-decade ago, nor because it had become more credible, but 
because it had been reinforced by repetition by the authoritative movement 
halfway-houses to which these citizens attend. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have focused on an unusual incident—the Daleiden-
Merritt sting/scam of Planned Parenthood—in order to raise broader ques-
tions about American democracy.  We broadened the field of inquiry from a 
single form of collective action to show its general relevance. 
In the Introduction, we argued that although the Planned Parenthood 
sting/scam codes as politically right-wing, the story is relevant to a broad 
range of activists: those who seek to expose animal abuse, environmental 
damage, exploitation of workers, and other evils.  Due to legal, social, and 
technological factors, this kind of activist journalism is likely to become ever 
more common in the coming years. 
In Part I, we looked at how the law addresses what seems to be the key 
puzzle raised by activist journalism: who can claim the protection for free-
dom of the press?  We saw that while First Amendment cases give some shel-
ter to journalistic activities, they provide no special rights to journalists as 
such.  That answer, which dates to pre-Internet-era cases, may seem presci-
 
 165 See Josh Clinton & Carrie Roush, Poll: Persistent Partisan Divide Over ‘Birther’ Question, NBC NEWS (Aug. 
10, 2016, 2:19 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/poll-persistent-partisan-
divide-over-birther-question-n627446 (finding that 41 percent of Republicans disagreed with the 
statement “Barack Obama was born in the United States, while only 27 percent agreed, with the 
balance neither agreeing nor disagreeing).  For a relatively recent version of this canard, which 
pretends to have Obama himself admitting to not being a citizen, see David Mikkelson, Obama 
Admits Not Being Born in Hawaii, SNOPES: FACT CHECK, http://www.snopes.com/poli-
tics/obama/birthers/notborn.asp (last updated June 27, 2016) (demonstrating that “[a] video clip 
showing Barack Obama supposedly acknowledging that he is not a natural-born U.S. citizen was 
assembled as a joke”). 
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ent, but it comes with an extremely important limitation.  Although laws spe-
cifically targeting journalists or journalism are invalid, well-informed govern-
ment officials and private actors can use general-purpose laws involving such 
mundane matters as property and contract to shield potential or perceived 
wrongdoers from the prying eyes of activists and journalists. 
In Part II, we juxtaposed the slim protection given to activists and jour-
nalists seeking to uncover wrongdoing with the substantial protection given 
to those who disseminate misleading and even outright false claims.  The law 
leaves genuine stings vulnerable, while protecting scams.  This juxtaposition 
may have developed organically out of America’s legal history, but in the 
technical and political conditions of the early twenty-first century, it is having 
perverse effects. 
In Part III, we showed that the combination of activism with journalism 
is nothing new, and, indeed, that the norm of “objective” journalism was 
probably an exception to a long history of social movement activists using the 
media to advance their goals.  The novelty of these interactions lies not in the 
intrusion by activists into other people’s premises to produce falsified findings, 
or in their diffusion to a wider public through electronic media, but in the 
combination of the two.  That combination is facilitated by employment of 
simple forms of technology and the availability of a broad spectrum of “move-
ment halfway-houses” to diffuse the “information” to a broader public.  In 
the name of “the public’s right to know,” these agents make the scams of ac-
tivists far more rapidly available to publics who are prepared to accept “truth-
iness” in place of truth so long as it jibes with their ideological assumptions. 
Observers of how Donald Trump and his supporters play fast and loose 
with the truth have only lately begun to worry about fake news, but the phe-
nomenon is broader and has deeper roots.  Daleiden and Merritt’s 
sting/scam was an extreme form of the performance journalism that new 
technologies have helped, if not to create, then to diffuse.  Thus, it may not 
be far-fetched to wonder whether significant sectors of the public have be-
come so taken with performance journalism that they mistake both the in-
ventions of a pair of anti-abortion activists and the truthiness of a Donald 
Trump for reality. 
Meanwhile, even as fake news may have helped elect Trump, some of the 
same forces that fueled the rise of scams will make good-faith stings by jour-
nalists and activists difficult to accomplish, just at the moment when progres-
sives would benefit from launching stings of their own.  Trump’s disregard 
for longstanding norms requiring presidential candidates to disclose their tax 
returns and presidents to divest assets that pose a substantial risk of conflicts 
of interest indicate that his administration is opaque even by the standards 
set in the recent era of over-classification.  Fearless investigative reporting 
will be needed more than ever; yet, as we have shown, law, technology, and 
culture will likely give us more and more fake news instead. 
32 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:1 
 
